What does your profile really say about you? Privacy warning systems and self-disclosure in online social network spaces by Emanuel, Lia et al.
        
Citation for published version:
Emanuel, L, Bevan, C & Hodges, D 2013, What does your profile really say about you? Privacy warning systems
and self-disclosure in online social network spaces. in CHI '13 Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in
Computing Systems. Association for Computing Machinery, New York, pp. 799-804, ACM SIGCHI Conference
on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI2013), Paris, France, 29/04/13.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2468356.2468499
DOI:
10.1145/2468356.2468499
Publication date:
2013
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
 What Does Your Profile Really Say 
About You?: Privacy Warning Systems 
and Self-disclosure in Online Social 
Network Spaces
 
 
Abstract 
This paper reports current progress on the design and 
initial evaluation of an innovative privacy feedback 
system aimed to provide social network users with 
tailor-made feedback about their identity exposure 
online. Preliminary results suggest our feedback 
system, based on a research driven model of identity, 
appears to reduce the amount of information 
individuals disclose about themselves in social network 
spaces. We discuss the impact of our feedback system 
on the way individuals share information online, as well 
as suggestions for a more fine-grained evaluation and 
future development of this feedback system. 
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 Introduction 
Nearly half of the top ten sites as ranked by Alexa are 
social networks or have social network-like elements 
within them. Many individuals maintain multiple 
accounts on different sites, as different sites satisfy a 
subtly different interaction experience. Whether it is for 
professional networking or finding romance, the 
underlying context of a social network can influence the 
type of information users disclose [1]. 
There has been significant academic research on the 
privacy and security concerns with data exposure on 
social network sites (SNS) e.g. [6,7]. More 
interestingly, the online community is taking steps to 
highlight the potential vulnerabilities introduced by 
overly disclosing on SNS; sites such as 
pleaserobme.com, weknowwhatyouredoing.com and 
the @needadebitcard twitter feed are proof of both the 
presence, and prevalence, of this over-disclosure. 
In addition to the security implications, the use of large 
amounts of publicly disclosed ‘private’ data for 
marketing and advert targeting is often overlooked by 
the public, yet arguably is more likely to impact them. 
Although feedback systems exist to warn users of 
general information tracking of this type (e.g. 
Ghostery) and can reduce the amount of information a 
user provides [8], these systems primarily raise privacy 
awareness around marketing and e-commerce actions. 
SNS, on the other hand, are distinctly different. They 
are interactional in nature, whereby information is 
shared with an online community to exchange opinions, 
beliefs and activities [2]. For this reason, we believe 
privacy warning systems need to adapt to the way in 
which users interact and exchange information within 
SNS. 
Social networking users are providing more content 
than ever before [4]. This content is, by definition, 
largely personal in nature and there is very little to 
provide users with privacy advice. Indeed, the 
business-models that enable most social networks rely 
on encouraging large-scale sharing of personal data. 
We propose introducing a higher-level privacy warning 
system. Rather than a notification warning users that 
they are being tracked or providing a generalized 
warning of ‘high-risk’ information disclosure, we aim to 
tailor the warning feedback to the individual and the 
specific information being disclosed.  
This project focuses on user’s disclosure behavior in 
two different online social network contexts, namely a 
dating network and a professional network. This paper 
reports progress so far on the development of our 
privacy warning system, and preliminary data on the 
effect of this warning system on user’s disclosure 
behavior within the two SNS using experiment design 
methods. In the evaluation of the warning system we 
had two main research questions: 
RQ1: Prior to any warning system intervention, do 
users tend to disclose information differently depending 
on the context of the social network?  
RQ2: Following tailored feedback about one’s potential 
online exposure are users more stringent with the 
information they disclose, as compared to those 
receiving no feedback? Does context play a role in the 
effect of the feedback system? 
Our goal is that the implementation of this warning 
system will benefit the social network user by providing 
relevant, real-time, feedback about their identity 
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 exposure online and allow them to make an informed 
decision about the implications of that exposure with 
regards to their privacy. 
Development of the privacy feedback system 
In order to help model identity we considered the facts 
about an individual as nodes – these facts could be 
things like email addresses, job descriptions, names 
etc. It is often possible to infer new facts from the 
current set; these inferences or transforms can be 
modeled as new links between nodes. A more complete 
description of this model, known as the SuperID Model 
[5], can be found in e.g. [3]. 
For this study, we used 37 possible input facts, which 
given the state-of-the-art transforms at the time of 
writing [3] resulted in 52 possible new output facts. 
The model is held on a server, which provides an API 
allowing others to query what new facts can be inferred 
from the current set. This model can easily be updated 
as new inferences are discovered. A plugin installed in 
the user’s browser searches each page for a form 
where a user submits personal data (e.g. when they 
were signing up for a new service). As the user 
completes the form, the plugin identifies certain types 
of fact, queries the server with the set of facts that are 
present and highlights to the user what extra 
information could be derived. It is important to note 
that simply the presence of a fact is sent to the server, 
not the value of the fact (i.e. the presence of a name is 
sent not that the name was Alice). 
Testing the privacy feedback system 
In order to explore the impact of this type of feedback 
system on user’s disclosure behavior, mock social 
network profile pages were created that could 
incorporate the privacy feedback plugin described. The 
mock profiles showed a template for a fictitious dating 
social network and a professional, job-seekers network 
profile (Figure 1). The profile had five themed text 
boxes: About me, Work/Education/Expertise, Location, 
Contact/Getting in Touch and Additional Information, 
for users to fill in.  
Preliminary data from 41 participants (12 males, 29 
females; age M = 23.02, SD = 6.20) has been 
collected. Participants were recruited from online 
University notice boards, and were randomly assigned 
to create either the dating social network profile 
(N=23) or the professional social network profile 
(N=18). Participants were asked to create a personal 
profile page using the five text boxes under the 
pretense that they were aiding online companies to 
improve their profile features. Once participants 
created and submitted their initial profile information, it 
was manually coded by classifying profile information 
into facts about the individual. These facts were 
submitted to the server to determine what information 
could be derived about the participant, given the 
information they had provided in their profile. While 
profiles were being manually coded participants were 
asked to complete a demographics questionnaire. 
Participants then reviewed their profile before 
submitting it to go ‘live’ on the social networks. 
Approximately half of all participants, through random 
allocation, received feedback from the privacy warning 
system during the review of their profile. Feedback 
included each fact given by the participant, how it was 
identified by the server and what additional information 
could be derived by other users on the social networks 
from that fact if it were made available online.  
 
 
Figure 1. Screen captures of the 
two social network mock profile 
pages 
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 Figure 2 shows an example of the feedback a 
participant could receive about their profile 
page. During the review of their profile, participants 
could edit information and were asked to set a privacy 
level for each of the five text boxes individually, such 
that the information in a text box could be viewed by: 
Only You, Approved Contacts, Groups/Networks You 
Join, Everyone.    
 
Figure 2. Example of privacy warning feedback about a user’s 
information exposure 
Results 
Initial profile submitted 
We were interested in exploring whether individuals 
disclose information differently depending on the social 
network context, prior to any type of privacy feedback. 
Across both network contexts, 23 of the possible 37 
input facts were present in the initial profiles. There 
was no difference in the number of facts disclosed in 
participants dating profiles (M = 7.22, SD = 2.13) and 
participants professional profiles (M = 8.39, SD = 
2.70), t (39) = -1.55, p = .13.1 To explore the content 
of the information disclosed, Table 1 illustrates the 
proportion of each fact type present in the dating 
network profiles and the professional network profiles. 
Fact Type Dating Professional 
    Personal Information 63.3% 40.8% 
Name 6.1% 4.1% 
Age 7.9% 4.1% 
Gender 1.8% 0.7% 
Location 15.9% 12.9% 
Nationality/Birth place 2.4% 2.0% 
Language 0.6% 0.7% 
Interests 9.1% 6.8% 
Personality* 19.5% 9.5% 
     Work Background 27.3% 42.2% 
Job Role 12.2% 12.9% 
Education 8.5% 10.2% 
Resume 1.8% 11.6% 
Expertise 3.0% 3.4% 
Company 1.8% 3.4% 
Work Address 0.0% 0.7% 
     Contact Information 9.1% 17.0% 
Email address 8.5% 12.2% 
Phone number 0.6% 4.8% 
Table 1. Proportion of fact types submitted in initial profiles by 
dating and professional context. * Seven facts related to 
personality traits were collapsed.  
                                                 
1 Exploratory analysis indicated there was no relationship 
between the number of facts disclosed and reported occupation 
status, r = -.05, p = .75, relationship status, r = -.12, p = .46, 
and gender, r = .02, p = .91. 
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 Profile review and privacy system 
To explore RQ2 we assessed the impact of the feedback 
system on information disclosure in two ways, the 
amount of facts present in the reviewed profiles and 
the privacy settings selected by participants. Changes 
participants made to their profile during the review 
period were considered in terms of facts that were 
altered (i.e., either edited or deleted) or facts that were 
added to their initial profile information. Overall, only 
7.7% of facts present in the initial profiles were altered.  
The greatest proportion of facts altered were in the 
work background (45.8%), followed by personal 
information (41.7%) and contact information (12.5%) 
fact types. Notably, only participants who received no 
feedback via our warning system provided additional 
information during the review of their profile (Table 2). 
This group added personal information (62.5% of 
added facts) and contact information (37.5% of added 
facts).  
Feedback 
No 
changes 
Added 
Facts 
Deleted 
Facts 
No Feedback 84% 4% 12% 
Feedback given 81% 0% 19% 
Table 2. Percentage of participants who made no changes, 
added facts and deleted facts in the review of their profile by 
privacy system feedback. 
In order to explore the effect of the feedback system on 
the number of facts present in participant’s final profile, 
and the role of the SNS context, a 2 (privacy system: 
no feedback vs. feedback given) x 2 (context: dating 
vs. professional) ANCOVA was run. The number of facts 
submitted in participants’ initial profile was used as a 
covariate. Results showed, after controlling for the 
number of facts in the initial profile, a marginal effect of 
privacy system, F (1,36) = 3.05, p = .09, ƞ2 = 0.08. 
Those given feedback on their initial profile submitted 
marginally fewer facts (M = 6.83) than those who 
received no feedback (M = 8.43) about their potential 
online exposure. However, there was no effect of 
context, F (1,36) = 0.87, p  = .36, ƞ2 = 0.24, nor was 
there an interaction between privacy system and 
context, F (1,36) = 0.25, p  = .62, ƞ2 = 0.01. 
The privacy settings selected by participants were 
coded as 1=Only You; 2=Approved Contacts; 3=Joined 
Groups and 4=Everyone; for the accessibility of each 
text box within the social network. These settings were 
averaged across the five text boxes for each 
participant’s profile. 
Feedback Dating Professional Total M 
No Feedback 2.10 2.62 2.39 
Feedback Given 2.26 2.50 2.34 
Total M 2.20 2.58   
Table 3. Mean privacy settings collapsed across the five profile 
text boxes by privacy system feedback and context.  
The direction of means listed in Table 3 suggest that 
those given feedback about their exposure during the 
review of their profile set their privacy settings slightly 
more stringently than those given no feedback. In 
addition, participants in the dating context set their 
privacy settings more stringently than those in the 
professional context. However, statistical comparison 
showed no significant effects of feedback or context on 
privacy settings selected (all effects, F (1,37) < 1). 
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 Conclusions and future work 
The results from the initial evaluation of the privacy 
warning system described suggests a promising start to 
addressing issues of privacy and security via over-
disclosing in SNS. The information provided in our mock 
social network profiles suggest that different types of 
facts are typically disclosed across different SNS 
contexts. By further understanding these variations, we 
can begin to adapt feedback systems to particular SNS. 
Furthermore, those who were given privacy feedback 
relevant to the information they were disclosing 
submitted fewer identity facts to SNS communities. 
Whereas, those who receive no feedback actually 
submit more facts about themselves while reviewing 
the profile they created. For future work, we aim to run 
further iterations to evaluate this warning system with 
larger sample sizes. For instance, a sample of 100 
would provide the power necessary to detect a 
significant effect of the warning system (at 0.83 
probability) on the number of facts disclosed given the 
reported effect size (ƞ2 = 0.08). Likewise, further data 
collection would also allow us to take a more in-depth 
look at what people are willing to disclose and the type 
of facts individuals are more likely to alter or protect 
via more stringent privacy settings. This type of fine-
grained analysis as well as collection of user experience 
measures would support further development of our 
privacy feedback system. For example, can we identify 
common feedback, or output facts, that result in more 
privacy-seeking behavior? Do individual differences in 
personality and attitudes towards online privacy 
influence the extent to which users act on minimizing 
their information exposure following feedback from the 
warning system? These are only a few of the questions 
that need to be addressed in order to refine the design 
and interface of, and eventually fully automating, this 
privacy warning system. Discussing the potential for 
this system with the wider HCI community will result in 
a more efficient and beneficial tool which allows SNS 
users to make an informed decision about their privacy 
online. 
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